[PDF] SoK: MEV Countermeasures: Theory and Practice-论文阅读讨论-ReadPaper
MEV.pdf
本文系统性地总结了四类应对 MEV 的方案,对现有的 28 种方案进行分类,并通过链上数据分析 MEV 竞价平台
Definition
- MEV: Miner/Maximal Extractable Value
- value that can be extracted by a miner from manipulating the order of transactions, as an upper bound on the extractable value
Common types:
- Frontrunning.
- paying high transaction fees so that the attacker's transaction is executed before anyone else
- Buy a rare NFT before anyone else
- Backrunning.
- placing the attacker's transaction immediately after the victim, to profit from the market dynamic created by the victim before others.
- Arbitrage between 2 DEX
- Sandwich attacks.
- places a pair of transactions right before and after the victim's regular trade.
- manipulate asset prices
- Bribery attacks.
- incentivize miners to take action in the interest of the attackers
- payment channels and atomic swaps
Countermeasures
-
MEV auction platforms
- make MEV extraction efficient, decentralized, and transparent.
MEV-Boost
-
Time-based order fairness.
- extend blockchains, enforce the ordering of transactions
- e.g. receive-order fairness, requires if a majority of nodes receive T1 < T2, then the final blockchain should respect that order.
-
Content-agnostic ordering
- the order of transactions is determined independently of transaction content
- users first commit to transactions → reveal them after the ordering has been determined
- weaker than receive-order fairness
- problems: metadata leakage, content-agnostic frontrunning
- popular for its simplicity and multiple implementations
-
MEV-aware application design.
- For specific applications
- DEX: batch auctions, orders are executed in batches so that the ordering within a batch does not make a difference.

